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Abstract 
We document day care enrolment gaps by family background in a country with a universal day care 
system (Germany). Research demonstrates that children of less educated or foreign-born parents can 
benefit the most from day care, making it important to understand why such enrolment gaps exist. 
Using a unique data set that records both stated demand and actual usage of day care we demonstrate 
that differences in demand cannot fully explain the enrolment gaps. Investigating supply-side factors 
using quasi-experimental designs, we find that reducing both parental fees and scarcity of places 
significantly decreases enrolment gaps by parental education but not by parental country of birth. We 
discuss implications for policy. 
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1 Introduction
By school starting age, children of less-educated or foreign-born parents are often behind
their peers on measures of child development (e.g. Bradbury et al., 2015; Carneiro and
Heckman, 2003). In many cases, these inequalities are already so deeply ingrained that
they are difficult to address through the school system. Day care is considered an effective
means of influencing child development in pre-school years, especially for children of less-
educated or foreign-born parents.1 As a result, universal day care is increasingly seen as
an opportunity to “level the playing field” for children of different family backgrounds (e.g.
Cornelissen et al., 2018; Felfe and Lalive, 2018; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011, 2015).
As a political concept, universal day care aims to ensure that all households, regardless
of their income or employment, have access to appropriate day care options. The role of
parental fees, if in place at all, is to capture some of the consumer surplus to help fund the
programme, but not to regulate supply and demand. As such, setting the right level of fees
and meeting resultant demand for day care slots is largely the responsibility of the public
sector. However, despite expanding access to day care, there remain enrolment gaps across
many OECD countries, even where universal day care systems are in place (e.g. OECD,
2018).
One reason that enrolment gaps may exist under a universal system is if less-educated
or foreign-born parents simply have a lower demand for day care. This could be the case
if they tend to prefer informal care arrangements, have more critical attitudes toward day
care, expect lower returns to investment in their children, or expect lower returns to working
(Boneva and Rauh, 2018; Cunha et al., 2013). Another reason that enrolment gaps may exist
is if there are shortages of day care slots or inhibiting day care fees. Less-educated or foreign-
born parents may be more affected by shortages if, for example, being better-resourced
1Payoffs exist in general because many skills develop early in life (e.g. Phillips et al., 2000) and because
longer payoff periods make early learning more productive (Becker, 1975). There may also be important
“dynamic complementarities” since early inputs strongly affect the productivity of later inputs (e.g. Cunha
and Heckman, 2007).
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helps parents secure scarce slots, or if discrimination is exacerbated under shortages.2 Less-
educated or foreign-born parents may also be less able to afford day care fees, even where
parental contributions are income-adjusted.
In the spirit of universal day care, we think of ‘demand’ in this paper as a simple yes/no
dichotomous measure that captures parental preferences for using day care, i.e. whether they
would enrol their child if offered a slot of appropriate quality at a non-inhibitive cost.3 We
think of ‘supply’ factors as any barriers to access that might prevent parents from enrolling,
such as a lack of availability or affordability (i.e. high parental contributions), or even a lack
of appropriate quality of places.
In order to investigate demand- and supply-side causes of day care enrolment gaps, we
use a large representative survey data set of more than 62,000 children younger than three in
Germany. Using this data, we start out documenting gaps in day care enrolment by parental
education and parental country of birth.4 We then explore the demand side as an explanation
for observed gaps by making use of the fact that our data set reports stated demand for day
care irrespective of actual enrolment. To examine the role of scarcity of places, we create a
measure of local shortages that is the difference between demand and the number of slots
at the county level. We estimate the effect of shortages on the enrolment gap in a panel
fixed effects model. As such we make use of within-county changes in shortages over time
that largely reflect differences in the timing of the roll-out of places across Germany. Finally,
to examine the role of parental fees, we use the synthetic control method to estimate the
impact of a substantial reduction of fees due to a policy change in one German federal state.
We find enrolment gaps of 14 percentage points by parental education and 12 percentage
points by parental country of birth—corresponding to gaps of around 37 percent in each
2In a randomised controlled trial, Andersen and Guul (2019) show that discrimination by public school
teachers is most acute when workloads are high.
3A willingness-to-pay measure would be problematic in that it captures ability to pay, or household
income, rather than only strength of preference. Enrolment gaps due to low-income households having a
smaller willingness-to-pay than the subsidised fees are framed as an access barrier rather than a demand-side
problem.
4These factors are more fixed than income or employment, which are endogenous with day care enrolment.
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case. We show that the demand gaps for these family backgrounds are much smaller than
the enrolment gaps. In fact, for children with migrant family backgrounds there is hardly
any demand gap at all. Overall, the enrolment gaps cannot be fully explained by differences
in demand. On the supply-side, we find that reducing day care shortages significantly de-
creases the enrolment gap by parental education but has no effect on the migrant-native gap.
Similarly for parental fees, a large reduction in one state significantly reduced the enrolment
gap by parental education but had no impact on the gap by parental country of birth.
In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that the enrolment gap for less-
educated parents may be reduced by reducing fees and/or through increasing availability.
However, the enrolment gap by parental country of birth does not seem to be affected
by changes to these supply constraints. Our results imply that the gap for foreign-born
parents reflect barriers to access that remain even when day care is available and affordable.
We suggest two possibilities: (i) that foreign-born parents face discrimination even where
shortages of places is less acute, or (ii) that foreign-born parents do not find the quality
of care to be adequate. The latter possibility could be the case if the quality of care is
lower in the areas where foreign-born parents typically live, if foreign-born parents are more
greatly affected by quality issues that affect everyone such as group size, or if foreign-born
parents are affected by specific quality concerns such as a lack of multilingual teachers or
consideration of different cultures.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the evolution and causes of educational
inequalities and intergenerational educational mobility (see e.g. Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes,
2011, for an overview). The existing economic literature mainly focuses on exploring socio-
economic status gradients in educational attainment or achievement, with a particular focus
on higher education (e.g. Boneva and Rauh, 2017; Machin and Vignoles, 2004; Hanushek
et al., 2019). Such gaps are both well documented and well understood in terms of their
major determining factors. Conversely, gaps in early educational settings are less well un-
derstood, despite the crucial importance of this early phase of life for later outcomes. Large
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and persistent gaps in enrolment in early education and care are well documented across
different institutional settings (e.g. Greenberg, 2011; Magnuson and Waldfogel, 2016; Stahl
and Schober, 2018; Zachrisson et al., 2013). However, the literature on the underlying drivers
of such gaps is thin. In particular, it lacks good data capturing demand- and supply-side
factors, thus failing to answer convincingly why day care enrolment gaps exist. Most pre-
vious research on the different demand- and supply-side factors is purely descriptive and
based on cross-country variation (e.g. Pavolini and Van Lancker, 2018) or time variation
within a single country or region (e.g. Sibley et al., 2015).5 The evidence from these stud-
ies is mixed. There is some suggestive evidence that supply-side factors, for example, the
availability of day care or its fees, are important for explaining the large gaps in day care en-
rolment (e.g. Abrassart and Bonoli, 2015; Bainbridge et al., 2005; Sibley et al., 2015; Pavolini
and Van Lancker, 2018). Others find the fee structure and the level of provision to be less
important (Van Lancker, 2018; Van Lancker and Ghysels, 2012).
We address this gap in the literature by using a large and representative data set of
children below the age of three in Germany that allows us to not only observe actual day
care enrolment but also demand for day care. Thus, we can provide evidence on whether
gaps in enrolment in early education and care simply reflect differences in demand between
groups. In addition, we use different empirical methods to investigate the role of regional
availability of day care spots and fees in explaining gaps by family background. The paper
proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the institutional background, Section 3 describes the
data used. Section 4 documents enrolment gaps by family background and examines the
role of differences in demand. Section 5 presents the impact on enrolment gaps for (i) local
day care shortages and (ii) day care fees. Section 6 interprets the results and provides policy
implications. Section 7 concludes.
5In addition, many previous studies define low-socioeconomic status by household income, a problematic
approach since the labour supply decision of women on the intensive and extensive margin is likely to be
endogenous to day care enrolment.
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2 Institutional background
In recent years, there has been a strong political effort to increase the provision of universal
and publicly subsidised day care in Germany. Thanks in part to a legal claim for children
older than three, in place since 1996, enrolment rates have consistently been above 90 percent
in the 2010s for this age group. For under threes, enrolment rates were persistently low until
around 2005. In 2005 (TAG) and in 2008 (Kifo¨G), two laws came into effect at the federal
level, committing local governments to gradually expand day care places for children under
the age of three. From August 2013 onward, every child above the age of one has a legal claim
to a place in day care. The reforms lead to a large increase in enrolment rates of children
under three. Whereas in 2006 the fraction of children under the age of three enrolled day
care was about 12 percent, the enrolment rates in 2018 were just under 34 percent. Despite
this increase, there are large and persistent day care shortages; i.e. demand for day care far
exceeds the number of places (Alt et al., 2017). In addition, the expansion has happened
heterogeneously across states, counties and municipalities, resulting in large variation in day
care shortages across regions.
The German day care system is highly decentralised with three levels of government
(federal, state and municipality), youth welfare offices (which mostly cover areas identical
to counties) as well as providers sharing responsibilities (Spieß, 2008). While the federal
government sets out the broad framework, the funding lies under the responsibility of the
states and municipalities. Municipalities must also decide through forecasts how many slots
need to be provided, but the provision itself is often done by non-profit providers. Non-profit
providers must be licensed by the youth welfare offices as being part of the local provision
plan and to ensure that the states’ required standards for services are being met. Almost all
day care places are publicly subsidised and provided by the municipalities themselves or by
non-profit organisations, including churches and welfare associations. For example in 2017,
33% of day care institutions were public providers, 59.2% other non-profit organisations, and
only 2.6% of institutions were private and non-charitable (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).
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On average, public subsidies cover about 70% of day care costs (Spieß, 2013), with some
states covering 100% for certain age groups and households.
The remaining proportion of day care costs is partly covered by parental fees. The fees
parents pay are usually income-dependent with a progressive fee structure.6 In some states
and municipalities, it also depends on other factors, such as the number of siblings, hours of
day care, and type of provision. There is no uniform rule at which regional administrative
unit the level of fees and exemption of fees are determined; as of 2018, in only one out of
the 16 federal states (the city-state Hamburg) this is determined centrally at the state level,
in four states at the level of youth offices, in three at the municipality level, in five states
at the carrier level and in three states at the municipality and carrier level (Autorengruppe
Bildungsberichterstattung, 2018). Some low-income parents, particularly all welfare recipient
families,7 are exempted from paying fees. Overall, parental fees amount to about 5-10% of
average earnings. Thus, they are lower than the OECD average and much lower than in
countries with low public subsidies like the US (OECD, 2016, 2019) and, importantly, fees
are fixed for certain periods of time and not determined by changes in demand or supply.
However, fees vary widely across regions, income, and family structure (Schmitz et al., 2017).
Before the introduction of the legal claim to day care for all children above the age of
one in August 2013, the federal law (Kifo¨G) stipulated that children whose parents (or the
single parent) are employed, in education, or receive unemployment benefits (Leistungen zu
Eingliederung in Arbeit im Sinne des Zweiten Buches) must be granted access to day care.8
Ultimately, these regulations provided preferential access to households without a stay-at-
home parent. Since the prevalence of stay-at-home parents may vary by parental background,
this change in law could potentially have impacted on enrolment gaps. However, we do not
6Parental fees are not paid to the individual day care institution. Thus, day care centres usually have no
financial incentive to take in children from families with higher income. However, they get larger subsidies
when they take in children with special needs.
7Children from welfare recipient families are in principle entitled to free day care. However, the law is
not binding.
8Some states and municipalities had additional regulations. For example, they gave priority in access to
single parent families or families who do not speak German at home (e.g. Spieß, 2008).
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believe this to be a confounding relationship for our analysis.9 Indeed our results are robust
to using just the periods before the change or just the periods after the change.10
Generally, families can freely decide which day care institution they choose. However,
due to severe day care shortages, the number of applications is typically much larger than
the number of available spots.11 The allocation of scarce slots is largely uncoordinated
(e.g. Fugger et al., 2017) and varies by region and the type of provider. Some providers
and counties have transparent selection criteria and a centralised application system, many
others do not. For example, public providers sometimes prioritise children who already have
or had a sibling in the same facility or live close by. Day care provided by churches might in
addition select families based on their religious affiliation (e.g. Herzog and Klein, 2018).
3 Data
In our empirical analysis, we use a unique representative data set, the German Child Care
Study (KiBS) of the German Youth Institute (DJI). The KiBS is an annual survey of children
and their households with a specific focus on children’s care arrangements (Alt et al., 2018).
The survey was first conducted in 2012 and we use information from all available waves,
covering 2012 through 2016. In each wave, the KiBS surveys approximately 800 children
in each of the 16 federal states in Germany. The data also include appropriate weights for
conducting national-level analyses.12 We focus on children in the under three age group,
where there is still considerable variation in day care enrolment. In total, we observe 62,437
children below the age of three, making the data set the largest available to analyse day care
9Our analysis is conducted at the local level, whereas the change in law was a national policy shift.
We have no reason to believe that the effects on the enrolment gaps were differential at the local level nor
correlated with change in shortages.
10Available on request.
11Despite the legal entitlement for all children above the age of one, there are few cases of legal action.
According to KiBS data, less than 1% of parents who state having demanded a slot but not receiving one,
report having undertaken legal action already.
12The sampling design leads to smaller states being oversampled. Survey weights, calculated on the state
level, account for this. A comparison of the weighted share of children under the age of three in day care
with administrative statistics in Appendix Table A1 shows that they resemble each other closely. All figures
and tables in this paper are based on weighted calculations using the KiBS data unless indicated otherwise.
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enrolment in Germany.
3.1 Day care demand and supply
A unique feature of the data is that parents report demand for day care irrespective of
actual enrolment. Parents are asked separately for each weekday, Monday-Friday, whether
they have a wish for day care on that day. If the parents report a wish for day care on
any day then they are coded as having a day care demand. To ensure this represents an
actual demand we create a stricter alternative measure that is equal to one only if the parent
additionally reports having made at least one application for a day care slot. However, only
around 5% of parents that report a wish for day care have not submitted any application,
indicating that the measure already captures a real demand for day care.
Given pervasive shortages in the German context, we use actual enrolment as a measure
of available day care slots.13 In any county, or for any child age group, we subtract the share
of parents who have a slot from the share of parents who demand a slot to create a measure of
shortages. Figure 1 plots day care demand, slots, and shortages (the difference) aggregated
by the child’s age in months. Below the age of one, both demand and slots are very low,
but demand jumps when the child turns one.14 The number of slots exhibits a much smaller
jump, which results in a substantial increase in shortages at this age. Afterwards, both
quantity demanded and the number of slots increase continuously with a slightly steeper
slope in availability. Overall, in our sample, 31% of children below three years are in day
care. The fraction of parents stating a demand for a place in day care amounts to about
44%. This implies that only 71% of demand is met, thus describing a situation of severe day
care shortages.
In our analysis, we consider county-level shortages as one main explanatory variable
13Official day care statistics in Germany take the same approach, based on the (reasonable) assumption
that the number of untaken slots is negligible.
14The sudden jump in demand between the 11th and 12th months is likely due to the end of paid parental
leave (e.g. Kluve and Schmitz, 2018) and the start of the legal claim to day care (introduced in 2013).
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Figure 1: Day care enrolment, demand and shortage by age
for the existence of enrolment gaps.15 County-specific day care shortages are defined as the
fraction of parents who state that they have demand for a slot in day care but whose children
are not enrolled in day care. County shortages range from 0 to 39.2%. See Figure A1 for the
distribution of county-level shortages and the deviations from state averages — the effective
variation used in one of our specifications.
For our analysis of shortages, we make use of two types of variation: (i) across counties
within states, and (ii) within counties over time. Since we aggregate individual data points
to create county measures, we restrict the sample to have a minimum of 50 observations per
county and year to reduce measurement error. This reduces the sample size from 62, 473 to
15The publicly available data set only contains identifiers for the federal states. Through confidential on-
site access we were granted access to anonymised county identifiers, i.e. we can distinguish between counties
but not identify them unambiguously. We were also able to add some specific county-level controls in the
analysis: an indicator for urban counties and indicators for the GDP tercile of counties within the state. As
described in Section 2, many decisions regarding the provision of day care are enacted at the municipality
level, one level smaller than counties, so an analysis at that level would in principle be appealing. However,
municipality identifiers are not available and due to the granularity (10,848 municipalities exist in Germany)
we would also be unable to create measures of local shortages. An analysis at the relatively fine county level
is still an advancement on previous studies and, as can be seen in Figure A1, sufficient variation exists at
that level.
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43, 691 (and the number of counties from 252 to 95), which has implications for the external
validity of our results that we explore in Appendix Table A2. In short, our results are a little
more relevant for larger, wealthier, and more urban counties. While our restricted sample
is no longer perfectly representative of Germany, it remains a significant advancement on
previous studies that focus on individual regions or highly selective groups. Furthermore,
the results are robust to the removal of this sample restriction.
The data also contains information on day care fees, as reported by parents in one of the
study years (2015). As described in the institutional context, fees vary by household income
and other characteristics. For those enrolled in day care, average fees are just below 240
Euros a month. Note that this number is larger than hypothetical average monthly fees if
all children were enrolled in day care, as fees are progressive and children from lower-income
households are underrepresented in day care.
We also have information on a number of other demand-side factors, including the num-
ber of applications submitted to day care institutions and hours of day care demanded.
Furthermore, the respondents are asked about reasons for not enrolling in day care. They
are discussed in more detail in Sections 4 and 6.
3.2 Family background
The data set contains various socio-economic characteristics of the main respondent and the
household. We focus on two main indicators to measure enrolment gaps: parental education
and parental migration background.16 The less-educated parents indicator is equal to one
for children where the respondent parent has no university entrance qualification (Abitur)
and zero otherwise.17 The foreign-born parents indicator is defined as being equal to one
16Children from foreign-born parents have the same right to day care as children from native parents.
Different rules apply for refugee children, but very few would be in the data in the sample period.
17Educational differences by Abitur vs. no-Abitur are reflected in financial resources of the household and
tertiary education obtained, making it a variable that captures socio-economic status. Another common
distinction made in the literature is whether parents have obtained tertiary education. As this information
is not available in all waves, we do not use this measure in our main specification, but report results in the
appendix.
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for children where both parents (or the single parent) are born in a non-Western European
and non-North American country.18 We make this distinction since Western European and
North American countries are in many ways similar to Germany. As a result immigrants
from these countries should be affected by shortages and fees similarly to Germans. Overall
48% of children are defined as being from a less-educated household and 15% are defined as
having two foreign-born parents.
Our selection of these indicators is based on several factors. Firstly, these are the sub-
groups for which enrolment gaps are often documented in research and in the public debate.
Secondly, these are the sub-groups most commonly found in the literature to have greater
child development benefits from day care enrolment. Thirdly, these indicators are thought
to be more fixed (exogenous) with respect to day care enrolment compared with alternatives
such as household income or labour force participation. Fourthly, it is plausible that both of
these groups face barriers to accessing public services, with each exploring a slightly different
dimension. For example, the foreign-born group may be more exposed to discrimination,
have a smaller network of German acquaintances, be less knowledgeable of the (application)
system and have lower levels of German-language skills; things that may give an edge in
securing a spot in a competitive environment. In the appendix, we investigate enrolment
gaps by alternative indicators: no university degree (57% of our sample), main language
at home not German (16%),19 welfare recipients (19%) and below-median pre-birth income
(the last two measures are only available in wave 4, and waves 4 and 5, respectively).
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample. Observation numbers differ between
the variables, as not all questions are asked in each wave and some are conditional on day
care enrolment.
18There are no parents from Australia or New Zealand in our data.
1910% of families speak German and another language to a same degree at home, meaning that only 6%
predominantly speak another language.
11
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Day care enrolment, demand and preferences
Day care enrolment 62473 .31 .463 0 1
Day care demand 62435 .436 .496 0 1
Day care shortage 62435 .125 .331 0 1
Total monthly fees (in Euros) 6149 238.363 137.622 0 730
Hours of day care demanded 57970 13.499 18.002 0 60
Number of applications 35710 2.417 3.718 0 25
Day care demand - strict measure 35994 .413 .492 0 1
Family background
Less-educated (no Abitur) 62473 .48 .5 0 1
No university degree 49664 .571 .495 0 1
German not main language at home 62287 .162 .369 0 1
One foreign-born parent 62473 .028 .164 0 1
Two foreign-born parents (& non-Western) 61338 .151 .358 0 1
Welfare recipient 23758 .185 .388 0 1
Other household and child characteristics
Age of child (months) 62473 18.294 9.326 0 35
Female child 62473 .483 .5 0 1
Number of children in household 61993 1.812 .859 1 5
Respondent has a partner 62271 .969 .173 0 1
Married 62473 .789 .408 0 1
Notes: Summary statistics pooled over all waves. The strict demand measure denotes an indicated
demand for day care and further requires at least one application to have been submitted. Questions on
general preferences for day care (not demand) asked in waves 1 to 4. Questions on fees are only asked in
wave 4 for those enrolled. Questions on pre-birth income only in wave 4, on number of applications in
waves 3 to 5, on welfare payments in wave 4 and 5. Low education denotes that the respondent’s highest
school degree is not Abitur, which qualifies for university entrance. Monthly fees, number of applications,
pre-birth income and number of children in household are winsorised at the 99th percentile.
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4 Enrolment gaps by family background and the role
of demand
Figure 2 shows the gaps in enrolment and demand for our two main categories (less-educated
and both parents born abroad) plus two alternative categories (no university degree and
German not main language at home). The coefficients are obtained from regressing enrolment
and demand on the binary categories of family background.20 Children from less-educated
parents have on average about 14 percentage points (ppt) lower enrolment rates than children
from more-educated parents (about 37% lower) but only about 8 ppt lower demand (17%
lower). Comparing the gaps in relative terms, demand would not seem to be able to explain
much more than one half of the gap. Children with both parents born abroad also have a
significant enrolment gap of about 12 ppt (37% lower) but have almost no demand gap (2
ppt, or 5% lower). Thus, the demand-side does not seem to be a main explanation for the
migrant-native gap. The gaps for our two alternative categories are quite consistent with
our main categories.
To show that differences are not just driven by overlapping categories, we also produce the
gaps by education and migration background when conditioning on (not) having a migration
background and having high-(or less-) educated parents, respectively. Results are shown in
Appendix Figure A3. The overall patterns remain, especially that demand does not seem to
be a main explanation for enrolment gaps by migration background.
Table 2 provides potential explanations for the different levels of stated demand. It shows
the reasons that parents give for not enrolling in day care. Focusing on the five demand-
side issues (indicated by a D in parentheses), differences are overall more pronounced by
education level. For example, less-educated parents are 15 ppt more likely to state ‘I’m at
home myself’ as a reason for not using day care (whereas the difference is only 5 ppt for
20Appendix Figure A2 shows these gaps specifically by parents’ country of origin, Appendix Table A3
compares the distribution of birth countries in our data with official statistics and characterises the sample
by country of origin.
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Figure 2: Gaps in day care enrolment and demand
Notes: Figure shows differences in day care enrolment and demand by four
measures of family background. Coefficients stem from regressing the depen-
dent variable on the indicator for family background in separate regressions.
The mean value among all respondents is indicated in the figure. Whiskers
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
foreign-born parents), and 11 ppt more to state ‘grandparents can take care of the child’
(4 ppt less likely for foreign parents).21 Differences in these factors help to explain the
differences in demand gaps by family background. However, they neither explain why there
are different enrolment gaps nor why enrolment gaps exist conditional on demand. An initial
insight into the role of supply-side factors is provided by the fact that less-educated parents
and foreign-born parents are more likely to report availability (A), fees (F) and quality
(Q) factors as reasons for not using day care, compared with more-educated and native-born
parents, respectively.22 On the whole, availability and quality factors appear to be important
for both groups, although perhaps comparatively more important for foreign-born parents
over less-educated parents. Fees are also important for both, although the difference in
21Such differences are consistent with findings from previous studies (e.g. Schober and Spieß, 2013).
22As explained in the introduction, we categorise willingness to pay and parental fees as supply-side
explanations in line with the institutional context.
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willingness to pay is greater by parental education than country of birth. Unfortunately we
lack good data on day care quality. However, in the next section we investigate the impact
of the other supply-side factors (availability and fees) on enrolment gaps.
5 The impact of supply-side barriers on enrolment gaps
5.1 Local day care shortages
To investigate the impacts of county-level shortages on day care enrolment gap, we start out
running a pooled OLS estimation:
Yicst = α0 + α1Li + α2Sct + α3(Li ∗ Sct) +X
′
ictα4 + λst + ǫicst (1)
where Yicst is day care enrolment of child i from county c in state s in year t, Li is an
indicator of either less-educated or foreign-born parents, Sct are county-level shortages, X
′
ict
is a vector of exogenous household controls (i.e. the age of the child in three categories and its
gender as well as the marital status of the respondent) and county-level controls (explained
below), and λst are state-year effects. The coefficient of interest, α3, indicates whether
the enrolment gap depends on the county-level shortages. The parameter is inconsistently
estimated if shortages are correlated with unobserved determinants of the enrolment gap in
the error term ǫicst.
Beyond shortages, the enrolment gap may be determined by supply-side factors, such as
fees, opening hours, and day care quality, that are determined by state and municipality
rules as well as local providers. Another important supply-side factor that may impact
disproportionately on less-educated or foreign parents is proximity of day care, which itself
may depend on the density of the municipality. On the demand-side, differences by family
background in the share of parents who have no wish for day care may depend in some way
on differences in local norms towards maternal labour market attachment. To some extent,
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Table 2: Reasons for not using day care
Family background All Education Migration background
High Less (4)−(3) No Yes (7)−(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Would use day care if ...
if day care was for free (F) 17496.00 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.05*** 0.14 0.22 0.08***
if the child had a full-day slot (A) 17310.00 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.03*** 0.08 0.14 0.06***
if the child had a half-day slot (A) 17281.00 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.05*** 0.13 0.23 0.09***
if opening hours were more suitable (A) 17240.00 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.06*** 0.15 0.25 0.10***
if day care institution was nearby (A) 17111.00 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.06*** 0.11 0.26 0.15***
if registration / application was easier (A) 4527.00 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.08*** 0.15 0.34 0.19***
if staff was multilingual (Q) 17078.00 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.03*** 0.05 0.18 0.13***
if groups were smaller (Q) 17180.00 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.04*** 0.17 0.27 0.10***
if culture / religion was considered more (Q) 17066.00 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04*** 0.03 0.13 0.10***
Reasons for not using day care
Did not get a spot (A) 26389.00 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.01** 0.10 0.15 0.05***
Insufficient opening hours (A) 31056.00 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.02*** 0.07 0.07 0.00
I’m home myself (D) 26454.00 0.61 0.53 0.68 0.15*** 0.60 0.65 0.05***
Want to raise child myself (D) 31125.00 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.07*** 0.75 0.78 0.03**
Child is too young (D) 31375.00 0.85 0.86 0.84 -0.02*** 0.85 0.84 -0.01
Child should spent time with siblings (D) 22242.00 0.36 0.31 0.40 0.10*** 0.35 0.45 0.10***
Grandparents can take care of child (D) 23833.00 0.32 0.26 0.37 0.11*** 0.33 0.28 -0.04***
Fear of negative influences (D) 4614.00 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.04*** 0.06 0.12 0.05**
Insufficient support at institution (Q) 4606.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.00 0.10 0.13 0.03
Insufficient consideration of culture (Q) 4613.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02*** 0.01 0.08 0.07***
Willingness to pay
Maximum fee for a day care spot (F) 1479.00 172.63 224.01 141.95 -82.06*** 184.31 145.28 -39.02***
Notes: D indicates a demand reason. We regard Q (quality), F (fees) and A (availability) as supply-side barriers. Education
denotes the highest schooling degree and migration backgrounds indicates whether both parents are foreign-born. Columns (2)-(4)
and (6)-(7) show the share of affirmative responses for the corresponding questions. Multiple affirmative responses are possible.
Columns (5) and (8) show the difference between the groups (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.). All questions are only asked
conditional on the child not being enrolled in day care.
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this may be the result of household sorting but also of longstanding cultural differences, i.e.
between East and West Germany and indeed of local labour market conditions themselves,
all of which may impact differentially by family background.
If any of these factors are related to shortages then there will be confounding relation-
ships. An example of a downward bias is if a lack of affordable housing means that denser
urban municipalities struggle to hire enough teachers to keep up with demand for slots (high
shortages) but that the generally close proximity of day care centres in denser municipalities
is favourable to less-educated enrolment (lower enrolment gap). An example of an upwards
bias is if there is less political will to expand provision of day care in traditionally conservative
areas (high shortages) and if the prevalence of conservative gender norms disproportionately
affects labour market participation of less-educated mothers (higher enrolment gap). But
bias of any direction is potentially plausible.
Some of these issues will be controlled for by the state-year fixed effects. For example, in
cases where rules are determined at the state level or where cultural norms vary at a coarse
level. To account for some remaining potentially confounding relationships we additionally
include county-level controls in Xict: an urban-rural indicator, and indicators for the GDP
tercile of counties within the state, plus interactions between the two county controls with the
family background (to account for differential effects, i.e. on the enrolment gap). Finally, to
deal with remaining unobservable covariates that could vary within state-year cells, such as
local norms or day care quality, we additionally include county fixed-effects in our preferred
specification:
Yicst = β0 + β1Li + β2Sct + β3(Li ∗ Sct) +X
′
ictβ4 + µc + λst + εicst (2)
where µc denotes county fixed effects.
The identifying assumption is that time-variation in shortages within a county is uncor-
related with unobservables that impact day care enrolment differently by family background.
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We argue that this is plausible since time-variation in shortages within counties should largely
reflect differences in the timing of roll-out of day care spots in response to the federal level
introduction of a legal entitlement to day care. Unobserved demand and supply factors that
affect the enrolment gaps such as local norms and day care quality are likely to be relatively
fixed over a short period. Differences in speed or timing of roll-out are used in several previ-
ous studies as a source of variation in day care supply that is exogenous to day care quality
or other factors that impact on child development (e.g. Cornelissen et al., 2018; Felfe and
Lalive, 2018).
Table 3 presents results from pooled OLS regressions based on equation (1) and county
fixed effects regression based on equation (2). Column (2) reports a negative and highly sig-
nificant relationship between regional day care shortages and the enrolment gap for children
from less-educated parents using the pooled OLS model. Specifically, an increase in short-
ages by 10 ppt is associated with a decrease in day care enrolment gap by parental education
of about 5 ppt. Column (4) reports the results with county fixed effects where the identifying
variation comes from changes in shortages within counties over time. The results are very
similar to the pooled OLS estimates and indicate that regional day care shortages have a
significant impact on the enrolment gap by parental education. As shown in Appendix Table
A4, very similar patterns emerge when differentiating by whether the respondent parent has
a university degree.23 Further, results are also robust to using the stricter demand measure,
see Section 3, to calculate shortages despite much lower observation numbers (results are
available upon request).
Columns (5)-(8) of Table 3 examine the role of regional shortages for enrolment gaps by
parental country of birth. In contrast to the estimates by educational background, the results
23As a robustness check, appendix Table A5 also shows coefficients when shortages are calculated leaving
individual i out of the calculation, i.e. S−ict =
1
N−1
N∑
n 6=i
Shortagenct. We prefer to use unadjusted shortages
as the main specification since the leave-one-out version introduces an unintended source of variation in our
fixed-effects estimation. Specifically, individuals that are enrolled will mechanically have a higher shortage
than individuals who are not enrolled in the same county. Nevertheless, the coefficients of interest (interaction
of the family background with shortages) remain virtually unchanged.
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Table 3: Day care enrolment, family background and regional shortages
Day care enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean of dep. var 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376
Less educated -0.105*** -0.035 -0.097*** -0.038
(0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025)
Less educated × shortage -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Migration background -0.093** -0.090* -0.086* -0.086*
(0.043) (0.049) (0.045) (0.052)
Migration × shortage -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Shortage -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State × wave FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 43,668 43,668 43,668 43,668 42,845 42,845 42,845 42,845
Note: County-level correlates based on equations (1) and (2). Migration background indicates that both
parents are born abroad and non-Western. The sample is restricted to a minimum of 50 observations per
county (Appendix Figure A4 shows robustness to different cut-offs). All estimates control for the sex and
age of the child, marital status of the respondent and county level controls (urban indicator and GDP tercile
within the state) interacted with the family background. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level,
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
suggest that regional shortages play a minor role in explaining the foreign-born parents
enrolment gap. The foreign-born interaction with regional shortages is not significant and
very close to zero in both empirical specifications (using state by wave or county and wave
fixed effects). Appendix Table A4 shows estimates based on the indicator “German not main
language at home.” Again, results are robust to using this alternative measure of migrant
family background.24
We further examine alternative specifications to investigate potential non-linear effects
of shortages and fees estimating a model with shortages as a binomial:
Yicst =γ0 + γ1Li + γ2Sct + γ3S
2
ct + γ4(Li ∗ Sct)
+ γ5(Li ∗ S
2
ct) +X
′
ictγ6 + µc + λst + uicst
(3)
24Additionally, results are also robust to imposing the restriction that both parents have to be non-
European (in contrast to the current definition of parents being non-Western European and non-North
American). These results are available upon request.
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We also estimate a semi-parametric model:
Yicst =
∑
b
δbSb,ct +
∑
b
πb(Li ∗ Sb,ct) +X
′
ictσ + µc + λst + eicst (4)
where Sb are bins for shortages 5 percentage points in width. The advantage of the non-
linear specifications is to gain insight into the effect size at different initial levels of shortages.
For example, the non-linear specification might reveal that marginal changes have little effect
on the enrolment gap at high levels of shortages, suggesting that only a large change would
be effective.
Figure 3 presents the results of the estimation of equation (3) and equation (4). For the
less-educated parents group, there appears to be a clear non-linear relationship between the
day care enrolment gap and local shortages. Specifically, the enrolment gap is close to zero
and not statistically significant when shortages are very low and then quickly increases to
around 10 ppt before effectively flattening out at higher levels of shortages (above about 20
ppt). The binomial specification finds a zero intercept (in contrast to the less flexible linear
specification) and the enrolment gap in the first shortages bin (0 ppt–5 ppt) is insignificant.
This implies that the enrolment gap may be substantially reduced when shortages are zero.
For the foreign-born parents category, a very different picture emerges: the enrolment gap
is fairly flat at about 10 ppt at all levels of shortages. This is consistent with findings from
the linear model in Table 3.
Overall the findings suggest that reducing regional day care shortages lowers the enrol-
ment gap for children of less-educated parents substantially, but it does not help to reduce
the migrant-native enrolment gap. We discuss interpretations of these results in section 6.
5.2 Day care fees
Next we focus on the role of day care fees as a determinant of the enrolment gap. Due to
the lack of time variation in the fee data we analyse the effect of a substantial reduction
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Figure 3: The enrolment gap by parental background at different levels of shortages
(a) Less-educated parents (b) Both parents born abroad
Notes: Graphical illustrations of the results of the estimation equation (3) and equation (4). The
solid line plots the enrolment gap by (a) parental education and (b) parental country of birth
against shortages and is equal to E[Yicst|Lit = 1] − E[Yicst|Lict = 0] = γ1 + γ4 × Sct + γ5 × S
2
ct
.
The dashed lines represent the 10% confidence intervals reflecting meaningful standard errors
computed for marginal effects following Aiken and West (1991). The markers plot the enrolment
gap in each shortages bin b, i.e. the parameters δ1b. The filled markers are significant at the 10%
level whereas the empty markers are insignificant. The grey area represents a kernel density plot
of the sample distribution.
in fees using the synthetic control method. Specifically, we examine the case of the federal
state of Hamburg, where fees were abolished for the first five hours of care per day in August
2014.25 Hamburg was the only state to change its fees regulation during our sample window
of 2012–2016.26 For those enrolled in half-day care, fees were eliminated completely, and for
those enrolled in more than half-day care, fees were reduced by an amount equal to the half-
day fee they would have paid previously (depending on the household income and number of
persons in the household). Thus, all parents of children 0-2 had a significant fee reduction.
Since Hamburg has a fixed fee regulation, only dependent on net household income and
25Each German federal state independently sets broad regulations for day care fees, e.g. which types of
households are exempted from fees. The detailed fee structure itself is set at a more regional level. Typically,
fees vary by hours of day care enrolment, household income and other household characteristics (see Section 2
for more details). Beginning in 2005, some states started abolishing day care fees, initially for older children,
subsequently for younger children.
26Before 2012, three states had abolished fees for the last day care year (6 years old), two states (Berlin
and Hamburg) had abolished fees for the last three years (3–6 years old), and Rhineland-Palatinate had
abolished fees for the last five years (1–6 years old). For Hamburg, fees were abolished for the first five hours
of daily care only, while the other states abolished fees for all-day care.
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household size (which we have in our data), we are able to compute the theoretical reduction
in fees for all Hamburg children in our sample (including those not in day care). Monthly
fees for the average household were reduced by a total of 178 Euros (63% of the pre-reform
fees). For the children of less-educated parents in our sample, fees are reduced by 162 Euros
and for the children of better-educated parents, the reduction amounts to 184 Euros. When
expressed as a share of net income, fees are reduced by 0.044 overall, 0.043 for children of
less-educated parents and 0.047 for children of better-educated parents. Thus, the relative
magnitude of the reduction was roughly comparable for both groups.
The large reduction of fees in Hamburg provides a quasi-random treatment that we use
to estimate the impact of fees on the enrolment gap using the synthetic control method
of Abadie et al. (2010). Specifically, we examine the evolution of the enrolment gap for
Hamburg (N = 3, 724 for Hamburg) before and after the reduction of fees, comparing it to
the evolution for a synthetic Hamburg constructed as a weighted average of the remaining
federal states, none of which changed their fees in the sample window. The weights for
creating synthetic Hamburg are chosen so as to best approximate the real Hamburg based
on pre-treatment values of the outcome variable and covariates.27 Following Kaul et al.
(2015), we choose two of the three available pre-treatment outcomes (2012 and 2014) and
four covariates (unemployment, population density, GDP per capita, and migration share)
to be used in selecting the weights matrix. The resultant weights are reported in Table 4.
Figure 4 shows the results by parental education. Panels (a), (b), and (c) plot the
evolution of enrolment from less-educated parents, enrolment from better-educated parents,
and the enrolment gap, respectively, over time for Hamburg and synthetic Hamburg. Each
light grey line plots the estimated effect when carrying out the synthetic control method using
one of the 15 non-treated control federal states as a placebo treatment, following Abadie et al.
(2010).28 These placebo treatment effects are used for statistical inference (also as Abadie
27Weights are chosen to minimise the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) for the outcomes variable
over the pre-treatment period. For more detail on the process, see Abadie et al. (2010).
28Rather than plotting the placebo treatment effects on a separate chart with a baseline of zero, we plot
them on the same chart using synthetic Hamburg as the baseline. Effectively we normalise the placebo
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et al., 2010), and the significance of post-intervention outcomes is marked on the plots. The
figures show that enrolment of children from less-educated parents increases, while it holds
constant for those from more-educated parents, and the enrolment gap decreases relative
to the synthetic control. These differences emerge in the first post-intervention period and
become statistically significant by the second post-intervention period.29 Overall, the average
of both post-intervention periods suggests a decrease in the enrolment gap by 7.3 ppt. This
is an economically significant effect size since it approximately halves the enrolment gap.
Between 2014 and 2016 the total number of slots held roughly steady in both Hamburg
and the synthetic control states as shown by the enrolment figures in Table A1. Thus, the
reduction of fees did not appear to coincide with an increase in slots. This fact may seem
inconsistent with the increase in enrolment by less-educated parents in Hamburg relative
to the control seen in Figure 4. However, this apparent difference is explained by the fact
that there is also a slight decrease in enrolment by children from more-educated parents
in Hamburg compared to the control group over the period (of around 1.5 ppt). Since the
more-educated group represents the majority in Hamburg (a share of 0.72 compared with
around 0.55 in the control states), the small decrease in attendance offsets the larger increase
by the less-educated group. Thus we can be fairly sure that the drop in the enrolment gap
is a fees effect since there are no correlated changes in supply.
To help provide a sense-check for the size of the estimate, we also carry out a pooled OLS
regression of equation (1) using the information on fees reported for one wave in the place of
the shortages variable. We report the results in appendix Table A7. Taking the estimate on
the interaction between fees and less-educated parents from column (2) and multiplying it
with the average fee reduction in Hamburg provides an expected reduction in the enrolment
gap of 0.057× 1.78 = 10.1, which is comparable to our synthetic control estimate.
We also carry out the synthetic control analysis for the enrolment gap by parental coun-
controls to synthetic Hamburg to visualise statistical inference on the same chart as the pre-trends.
29In the synthetic control method, significance levels are based on comparing the deviation between the
treated unit and the synthetic control to the typical deviation between the donors and the synthetic control.
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Figure 4: The effect of fee elimination in Hamburg on the enrolment gap (by parental
education)
(a) Less-educated parents (b) More-educated parents
(c) Enrolment gap
Notes: Figures show the evolution in Hamburg vs. synthetic Hamburg of (panel a) the enrolment rate
of children from less-educated parents; (panel b) the enrolment rate of children from better-educated
parents; and (panel c) the enrolment gap. All interviews for the 2014 wave occurred before fees were
eliminated, making this the last wave with fees—as indicated by the vertical line. Weights for the
synthetic Hamburg are reported in Table 4. Each light grey line plots the estimated effect (relative to
synthetic Hamburg) when carrying out the synthetic control method using one of the 15 non-treated
control federal states as a placebo treatment, following Abadie et al. (2010).
try of birth and present the results in Figure 5. The enrolment of children with migrant
family background is unaffected by the change in fees. The native group sees an increase in
enrolment; however the effect is small and does not seem to persist, nor is there a significant
increase in the enrolment gap in any post-intervention period.
Overall, we conclude that reducing fees appears to have large effects on the enrolment
gap by parental education, even when fees are income-dependent, but does not impact the
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Figure 5: The effect of fee elimination in Hamburg on the enrolment gap (by parental country
of birth)
(a) Both parents born abroad (b) At least one parent not born abroad
(c) Enrolment gap
Notes: Figures show the evolution in Hamburg vs. synthetic Hamburg of (panel a) the enrolment rate of
children with both parents born abroad; (panel b) the enrolment rate of children with at least one parent
not born abroad; and (panel c) the enrolment gap. All interviews for the 2014 wave occurred before
fees were eliminated, making it the last wave with fees—as indicated by the vertical line. Weights for
the synthetic Hamburg are reported in Table 4. Each light grey line plots the estimated effect (relative
to synthetic Hamburg) when carrying out the synthetic control method using one of the 15 non-treated
control federal states as a placebo treatment, following Abadie et al. (2010).
enrolment gap by parental country of birth. Thus these results mirror those for the impacts
of day care shortages in the previous section.
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Table 4: Synthetic Hamburg weights
by parental education by parental country of birth
State Low High Gap Foreign Native Gap
Schleswig-Holstein 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lower Saxony 0 0 0 0 0.389 0
Bremen 0.239 0 0.393 0 0 0
North Rhein-Westphalia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hesse 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhineland-Palatinate 0 0 0 0 0 0
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0 0 0.334 0.288 0 0.313
Bavaria 0.363 0 0 0 0 0.142
Saarland 0 0.636 0 0 0 0
Berlin 0 0 0 0.510 0.439 0.392
Brandenburg 0.0580 0.364 0.273 0.202 0.171 0.153
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saxony 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saxony-Anhalt 0.340 0 0 0 0 0
Thuringia 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Interpretation of the results and policy suggestions
The results from the enrolment gap by parental country of birth are somewhat less straight-
forward to interpret. The enrolment gap by country of birth is (a) not reflected in a significant
demand gap, (b) still there at low levels of shortages, (c) not bigger or smaller at higher levels
of shortages, and (d) not bigger or smaller after a big reduction in fees. Any explanation for
the enrolment gap for foreign-born parents needs to be able to fit these four facts.
Firstly, the lack of a significant demand gap allows us to rule out that the enrolment gap
is because foreign-born parents do not want a place due to different preferences. One might
worry that stated preferences reflect parental aspirations and not actual willingness to enrol.
However, this does not seem consistent with the fact that 95% of parents that indicate a
demand, also report having made applications to day care centres.
Secondly, enrolment is not well explained by differences in search effectiveness, since the
enrolment gap is unaffected by the level of shortages. Factors such as being well-networked
and knowing to apply extremely early are likely to give applications from native-born an
‘edge’ when shortages are high. Thus, if the enrolment gap was due to these factors one
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would expect it to decrease as shortages lessen—but it doesn’t. Other possible factors, such
as a complete lack of understanding of the application process or a complete lack of German
language, may continue to be important even with low shortages if they prevent foreign
parents from applying at all. However, this is not consistent with the fact that almost all
parents that demand a spot have also managed to submit at least one application.
Thirdly, we cannot rule out discrimination as an explanation for the enrolment gap.
If discrimination against foreign-born parents is strong enough, then it would result in an
enrolment gap that does not necessarily get smaller with marginal increases in the availability
of places. Foreign-born parents will struggle to find a place even at relatively low level of
shortages if they are at the ‘back of the queue’ for any spot as a result of discrimination.
Thus, if discrimination does explain the enrolment gap then it should be of a form stronger
than that faced by less-educated parents, on average.30 This would be consistent with the
literature that shows discrimination against ethnic minorities in a wide range of contexts in
education, including at day care centres (e.g. Batsaikhan et al., 2019, for Denmark).
Fourthly, it appears that financial concerns are no more or less important for foreign
parents than other parents, based on the result that eliminating fees does not lower the gap
in enrolment. This is somewhat consistent with the fact that the difference in maximum
willingness to pay for a day care spot between foreign-born parents and other parents is
smaller than the same difference by education (Table 2).
Fifthly, there may be further barriers to access that exist even in areas of low shortages.
One possibility is day care quality. Even if parents report wanting a day care spot, and spots
are available and affordable, they will not enrol their children if they find the quality to be
too low. In fact, Table 2 shows that foreign-born parents are more likely than other parents
to report any of the quality indicators (Q) such as group size, opening hours, and proximity
of care as reasons for not enrolling their children in day care. Gaps by parental education
30We are not able to distinguish between different reasons for discrimination e.g. if centres make assump-
tions about workload based on parent characteristics (statistical discrimination), or if they hold implicit or
explicit racial bias (taste-based discrimination).
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also exist, but they are always smaller. One potential explanation for these differences is
that foreign-born parents place a greater emphasis on quality compared with other parents.
However, it could also be that foreign-born parents live in areas with lower day care quality,
making these concerns more prevalent. Foreign-born parents may also have specific quality
concerns. Indeed, foreign parents are three to four times more likely than other parents to
cite “if staff were multilingual” and “if culture/religion were considered more” as factors that
would lead them to enrol. Notably, citing these quality factors does not seem to be related
to lower parental demand for day care, suggesting parents see these as supply-side issues.
In terms of policy recommendations, one should expand availability and reduce fees to
close the enrolment gap by parental education. The policy recommendations for the en-
rolment gap by parental country of birth, however, are a little more tentative. Ensuring
adequate availability and affordability of care are surely an important starting point. How-
ever, our results imply that this is unlikely to be enough. To close the gap, policymakers
should consider ensuring that day care centres deliver adequate high-quality care for all chil-
dren respective of diverse cultures. Assistance in the application process itself could help
if some parents struggle with understanding the system or the German language. Indeed,
a third of foreign-born parents state that they would be using day care if the application
process was easier (Table 2). Assistance like this could perhaps be provided by family centres
and during home visits by midwives following birth. Finally, diversity training for staff may
be an effective approach to tackle discrimination.
7 Conclusion
Despite expansions in day care provision for the under-three age group in Germany, there
are substantial gaps in day care enrolment by family background. We show that demand
for day care cannot fully account for enrolment gaps. Our results suggest that day care fees
and local day care shortages play a significant role in explaining gaps by parental education.
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Reducing day care fees (or a more progressive fee structure) and reducing regional day care
shortages can lower enrolment gaps by parental education substantially. However, enrolment
gaps by parental country of birth are less affected by changes in local supply-side factors.
We interpret our results and discuss policy measures for addressing enrolment gaps in each
case.
Given the great potential of high-quality day care to reduce inequalities in later life
outcomes by family background, it is important to have a thorough understanding of why
enrolment gaps in day care exist and how to reduce them. Our study provides a first
comprehensive analysis based on large sample data. We capture important supply-side
factors: the availability of day care slots and parental fees. One factor that we do not
observe is the quality of the day care centres. Further, we know little about the magnitude
and type of discrimination facing less-educated or foreign-born parents. Our results suggest
that these factors may be important, particularly for the enrolment of children of foreign-born
parents. Field experiments could contribute to filling this gap and help to better understand
the nature of enrolment gaps in day care, while also proposing solutions to reduce them. We
leave this for future research.
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Appendix (for online publication)
Figure A1: Shortages in day care
(a) County shortages in percent (b) Demeaned county shortages
Notes: Figure shows (a) raw shortages in day care at the county level; and (b) demeaned county shortages
subtracting the state-level average. An individual shortage denotes that a day care spot is desired for the
child, but the child is not enrolled. Shortages are calculated at the county by year level. The sample is
restricted to 50 county by year observations. Panel (b) omits the city-states of Berlin and Hamburg as these
are absorbed in our analysis by state and wave fixed effects.
A1
Figure A2: Day care enrolment and demand by birth country of the parents
Note: Figure shows day care enrolment and demand by birth country of the responding
parent.
A2
Figure A3: Conditional gaps in day care enrolment and demand
Notes: Figure shows differences in day care enrolment and demand by two measures
of family background (education and migration background — defined as having two
foreign-born parents), conditional on (not) having a migration background and having
high-(or less-) educated parents respectively. Coefficients stem from regressing the
dependent variable on the indicator for family background conditional on the factors
indicated in separate regressions. Reading example; the day care enrolment gap for
children from less-educated parents is 12.2 ppt when no or one parent is born abroad
and 17.3 ppt when both parents are born abroad (solid black circles in the left side of
the figure). Mean enrolment is 0.31 and mean demand 0.436. Whiskers indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
A3
Figure A4: Interaction term of Table 3 by sample restriction
(a) Less-educated parents , col (4) (b) Both parents born abroad, col (8)
Notes: Figures show the coefficient of the interaction term of the county fixed effect model in Table 3
for different county by year number of observation restrictions (in intervals of five). The coefficients are
obtained from the specification shown in columns (4) and (8) for less-educated parents and foreign-born
parents, respectively. The bold markers indicate the coefficients shown in the table. Whiskers present 95
percent confidence intervals. The grey line and the y-axis on the right show the number of observations used
in each estimation.
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Table A1: Share of children below 3 years in child care -
comparison of KiBS and official statistics
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
KiBS Difference KiBS Difference KiBS Difference KiBS Difference KiBS Difference
Federal state (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Schleswig-Holstein 0.241 -0.001 0.262 -0.001 0.295 -0.008 0.320 0.006 0.311 0.002
Hamburg 0.358 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.427 -0.003 0.453 0.020 0.429 0.000
Lower Saxony 0.220 -0.001 0.244 0.000 0.275 -0.004 0.283 0.000 0.285 0.001
Bremen 0.212 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.264 -0.005 0.281 0.010 0.271 0.001
North Rhein-Westphalia 0.181 0.000 0.198 -0.001 0.233 -0.005 0.266 0.007 0.257 0.000
Hesse 0.236 -0.001 0.256 -0.001 0.283 -0.005 0.306 0.009 0.297 0.000
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.269 -0.001 0.282 0.000 0.304 -0.002 0.312 0.006 0.301 0.002
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0.231 0.000 0.248 -0.001 0.274 -0.004 0.285 0.007 0.279 0.002
Bavaria 0.230 0.000 0.247 -0.001 0.269 -0.002 0.281 0.006 0.272 0.000
Saarland 0.220 -0.001 0.245 -0.001 0.263 -0.007 0.286 0.003 0.287 0.004
Berlin 0.425 -0.001 0.436 -0.001 0.459 -0.001 0.475 0.016 0.459 0.000
Brandenburg 0.534 0.000 0.536 0.000 0.572 -0.006 0.579 0.011 0.572 0.000
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.536 0.000 0.544 -0.001 0.556 -0.005 0.562 0.002 0.560 0.000
Saxony 0.464 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.494 -0.005 0.511 0.005 0.507 0.001
Saxony-Anhalt 0.575 0.000 0.577 0.000 0.577 -0.006 0.583 0.004 0.572 0.002
Thuringia 0.497 -0.001 0.513 -0.001 0.519 -0.005 0.527 0.003 0.524 0.002
Notes: Comparison of the share of children below 3 years in day care as calculated with the KiBS data with official statistics
provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
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Table A2: Comparison of analysis sample with dropped observations
Analysis sample Dropped observations Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: individual characteristics
Day care enrolment 0.374 0.243 0.131***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Day care demanded 0.490 0.380 0.110***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Day care shortage 0.115 0.136 -0.021***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Lower education (no Abitur) 0.403 0.560 -0.157***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
No university degree 0.493 0.660 -0.167***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
German not main language at home 0.169 0.155 0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Both parents born abroad (& non-Western) 0.144 0.158 -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Employed 0.451 0.415 0.036***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Necessity weighted net equivalent income 1984.15 1729.88 254.28*
(38.715) (26.626) (46.987)
Panel B: county characteristics
Urban county 0.671 0.216 0.455***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
1st GDP tercile 0.042 0.276 -0.234***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
2nd GDP tercile 0.273 0.374 -0.101***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
3rd GDP tercile 0.685 0.350 0.335***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Panel C: share of federal states
Schleswig-Holstein 0.046 0.019 0.027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hamburg 0.049 - -
(0.001)
Lower Saxony 0.083 0.103 -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Bremen 0.016 - -
(0.000)
North Rhein-Westphalia 0.051 0.389 -0.338***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Hesse 0.078 0.076 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.063 0.031 0.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0.104 0.166 -0.062***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Bavaria 0.177 0.140 0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Saarland 0.020 0.001 0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Berlin 0.097 - -
(0.002)
Brandenburg 0.037 0.019 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.033 0.004 0.029***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Saxony 0.077 0.024 0.053***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.033 0.017 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Thuringia 0.036 0.014 0.022***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 43,691 18,782 62,473
Notes: Comparing characteristics of observations used in the analysis sample and ob-
servations dropped due to the sample restriction of having at least 50 observations per
county and year. Panel A shows individual characteristics, Panel B displays the share of
observations coming from each federal state. *** *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Appendix Table A2 compares the analysis sample with the dropped observations. The
sampling design favours observations coming from counties with a larger population (espe-
cially urban counties) and those from federal states with a smaller population as these have
fewer counties and every state has roughly the same number of unweighted observations per
year. The analysis sample is positively selected; day care enrolment, income, and employ-
ment rates are higher, the share with foreign-born parents and less-educated parents levels is
smaller (all differences are significant at the 1 percent level). Although the sample restriction
means that our sample is not fully representative for Germany, the data used still covers a
large fraction of the German population and advances on previous studies looking at specific
groups or smaller regions.
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Table A3: Characteristics by country of origin
Share of migration population Day care
Number of Less- Household
Microcensus 2017 KiBS Enrolment Demand Shortage applications educated net income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Germany - - 0.332 0.439 0.107 2.789 0.457 4084.169
Western Europe and North America 0.091 0.177 0.327 0.461 0.133 2.954 0.393 4063.182
Other Europe 0.360 0.519 0.216 0.404 0.188 2.137 0.589 3122.679
Turkey 0.136 0.090 0.117 0.402 0.285 1.56 0.801 2906.720
Asia 0.221 0.105 0.18 0.438 0.257 2.081 0.64 2985.501
Africa 0.062 0.060 0.257 0.479 0.220 1.957 0.534 2826.919
Others 0.127 0.049 0.321 0.502 0.180 3.159 0.368 3554.822
Notes: Table shows characteristics of children with different migration backgrounds. Shares of the Microcensus data refer to children aged
0-5, KiBS data 0-3. For Western Europe and North America, and Other Europe the composition between Microcensus and KiBS data differs
slightly as the Microcensus data only contains the number of children from EU28 and the 12 countries with the largest migrant population
share of those. Western European countries not listed are thus assigned to Other Europe, leading to an underestimation of the Western
Europe share in the Microcensus. When countries are assigned to EU28 and residual European countries the share in the Microcensus are
0.291 and 0.286, and 0.344 and 0.386 in the KiBS respectively. In the KiBS data, the country refers to birth country of the responding
parent. Microcensus data obtained from the Federal Statistical Office.
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Table A4: Day care enrolment, family background and regional shortages -
alternative family background definition
Day care enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean of dep. var 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375
No university -0.095*** -0.031 -0.086*** -0.031
(0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032)
No university × shortage -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Migration background -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.127*** -0.126**
(0.042) (0.049) (0.043) (0.050)
Migration × shortage -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Shortage -0.004*** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State × wave FEs Y Y Y Y
County FEs Y Y Y Y
Wave FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 35,603 35,603 35,603 35,603 43,536 43,536 43,536 43,536
Notes: The sample is restricted to leave-one-out shortages calculated from at least 50 observations per county.
Migration background indicates that German is not the main language at home. All estimates control for
the sex and age of the child, marital status of the respondent and an indicator for urban counties, the county
fixed effects estimates include regional controls at the state by year level (unemployment, population density,
GDP per capita and migration share). Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Day care enrolment, family background and regional shortages - leave-one-out
shortage
Day care enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean of dep. var 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376
Less educated -0.105*** -0.035 -0.097*** -0.041
(0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025)
Less educated × shortage−i -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Migration background -0.097** -0.099** -0.090** -0.099*
(0.043) (0.050) (0.045) (0.051)
Migration × shortage−i 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Shortage−i -0.001* 0.001 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.001* -0.001* 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State × wave FEs Y Y Y Y
County FEs Y Y Y Y
Wave FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 43,668 43,668 43,668 43,668 42,845 42,845 42,845 42,845
Notes: In contrast to Table 3, this table uses leave-one-out county shortages, i.e. excluding the individual
contribution. County-level correlates based on equations (1) and (2). Migration background indicates that
both parents are born abroad and non-Western. The sample is restricted to a minimum of 50 observations
per county. All estimates control for the sex and age of the child, marital status of the respondent and an
indicator for urban counties. The county fixed effects estimates include regional controls at the state by year
level (unemployment, population density, GDP per capita and migration share). Standard errors, clustered
at the individual level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Day care enrolment, family background and regional shortages
Day care enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of dep. var 0.378 0.378 0.391 0.391
Below median pre-birth income -0.149*** -0.096
(0.057) (0.070)
Low income × shortage -0.003
(0.002)
Welfare recipient -0.190*** -0.227***
(0.065) (0.075)
Welfare × shortage 0.002
(0.002)
Shortage -0.004** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
State × wave FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,422 8,422 17,090 17,090
Notes: County level correlates based on equation (1) and (2). The sample is restricted
to a minimum of 50 observations per county. All estimates control for the sex and age of
the child, marital status of the respondent. Information on pre-birth income and welfare
recipient status available in wave 4, and wave 4 and 5 respectively. Standard errors, clustered
at the individual level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A7: Day care enrolment, family background and fees
Day care enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of dep. var 0.378 0.378 0.377 0.377
Less-educated -0.182*** -0.050
(0.053) (0.072)
Less-educated × fees -0.057***
(0.021)
Migration background 0.022 0.043
(0.076) (0.101)
Migration × fees -0.009
(0.028)
Day care fees 0.036*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.053***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
State FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,987 8,987 8,941 8,941
Notes: County level correlates based on equation (1). The sample is restricted
to a minimum of 50 observations per county. All estimates control for the sex
and age of the child, marital status of the respondent and indicators for urban
counties and terciles for the GDP per capita of the counties. As fees are only
available for those in day care, we use our data set to impute hypothetical fees for
all children. For this we regress observed day care fees on a number of variables
that commonly determine day care fees (number of children in household, 15
household net income bins, age dummies for the children, desired hours corrected
by the median gap between desired and actually used hours for those enrolled
in day care, and a binary indicator for welfare recipient). Regressions are run
by state and include county fixed effects to allow for regional variation in fee
structure. In a second step, we predict hypothetical fees for each child based on
the coefficients obtained above and then compute the county average. Standard
errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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